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In this article, we explore how independently reported measures of subjects’ cognitive
capabilities, preferences, and sociodemographic characteristics relate to their behavior
in a real-effort moral dilemma experiment. To do this, we use a unique dataset, the
Chapman Preferences and Characteristics Instrument Set (CPCIS), which contains over
30 standardized measures of preferences and characteristics. We find that simple
correlation analysis provides an incomplete picture of how individual measures relate
to behavior. In contrast, clustering subjects into groups based on observed behavior in
the real-effort task reveals important systematic differences in individual characteristics
across groups. However, while we find more differences, these differences are not
systematic and difficult to interpret. These results indicate a need for more comprehensive
theory explaining how combinations of different individual characteristics impact behavior
is needed.
Keywords: cognitive capabilities, personality, preferences, real effort, abstract effort, moral dilemma, experiment,
survey
INTRODUCTION
Mainstream economic theory routinely assumes that individuals have stable, consistent preferences
that at least partly determine their behavior and revealed preferences (Samuelson, 1948; Stigler
and Becker, 1977). Behavioral and experimental economists have explored the validity of that
assumption, and phenomena like preference reversals, endowment effects, framing, and the
Ellsberg paradox imply that individuals lack stable, consistent preferences.
Most lab experiments attempt to induce consistent preferences using conditional rewards based
on Smith’s (1976) Induced Value Theory. In these experiments, failure to observe the behavior
implied by the induced preferences leads researchers to question the narrow self-interest hypothesis
and search for alternative theories. This process has contributed to a deeper understanding of
preferences by examining how experimental designs and subject characteristics affect behavior
(Frank and Glass, 1991; Becker, 2013). For example, experimental results imply that subjects are
partially motivated by fairness (Rabin, 1993), equality (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006), ambiguity
aversion (Fox and Tversky, 1995), and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
We argue that even with substantial improvements over the past decades in our understanding
of how individual characteristics correlate with individual actions, several key questions remain:
Are there systematic differences among individuals? For example, do variations in individual
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characteristics matter? If so, which characteristics influence
behavior? Do actions reveal more than psychological indicators
of behavioral types? Furthermore, little is known about how the
answer to these questions depends on the elicitation method.
There are two prevalent approaches used to try to answer
these questions: (1) surveying with primary experiments; and
(2) adding secondary experimental tasks. In the first approach,
researchers use questionnaires either before or after the primary
experimental task. For example, several authors have explored
how psychological characteristics influence economic behavior
using this method—e.g., personality traits (Almlund et al.,
2011; Ferguson et al., 2011); emotions (Pixley, 2002); and
sentiments (Smith and Wilson, 2013). Corgnet et al. (2015)
found that reflective individuals, as measured by the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT), exhibited more consistently mildly
altruistic actions in a lab experiment. Frederick (2005) and
Burks et al. (2009) found that cognitive capabilities related
to time and risk preferences. Other researchers investigated
the interaction between personality traits and risk and time
preferences (Rustichini et al., 2012). Researchers have also linked
experimental behavior to the results of testing such for IQ
(Oechssler et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012, 2015), social
intelligence (Takagishi et al., 2010), and personality (Almlund
et al., 2011; Rustichini et al., 2012). However, the findings are
not consistent with one another (Ben-Ner et al., 2007; Eckel and
Grossman, 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Hirsh and Peterson, 2009;
Oechssler et al., 2009; DeAngelo et al., 2015).
The alternative approach is to add secondary experiments
that are designed to measure preferences or characteristics.
Researchers use these measures to determine the relationship
between a subject’s actions in the primary experiment and
their individual preferences or characteristics. Examples of this
practice are the use of the Dictator Game, the Trust Game
and Risk and Time Preference experiments as complements
to primary experiments. Unfortunately, correlations between
behavior in the primary and secondary experiments have not
been consistent. For example, while characteristics such as
risk preferences have accompanied behavior in games such as
repeated prisoner’s dilemmas and beauty-contest games (Boone
et al., 1999; Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002; Goeree
et al., 2003; Brocklebank et al., 2011; Lönnqvist et al., 2011;
Kagel and McGee, 2014), the same characteristics sometimes
failed to correlate (Aycinena et al., 2014). Another approach
has found that in prisoner dilemma games, there are interesting
evolutionary explanations for the existence of different types
(Congleton and Vanberg, 2001).
In this article, we alter these approaches to address the
inconsistencies described above. First, we utilize individual-
level subject data collected on different occasions. That is,
our measures of individual characteristics and preferences were
collected in different experimental sessions from our primary
experiment. We argue that, while difficult, using data collected
from different experimental sessions implies that subjects are
less likely to be influenced by portfolio and wealth effects across
tasks. Secondly, we leverage a large dataset with over 30 measures
of individual characteristics and preferences, the Chapman
Preferences and Characteristics Instrument Set (CPCIS). These
include measures of several types such as: personality traits,
preferences, strategic behavior in simple games and the socio
demographics of our experimental subjects. Furthermore, the
CPCIS was not designed or implemented by us, so it reduces
the potential presence of any experimental demand effect.
More specifically, the CPCIS not only measures characteristics
that we hypothesize to influence the behavior in our primary
experimental task, but also a large set of variables which a priori
should not influence actions in it.
Our primary experiment, based on Green (2014), presents
experimental subjects with a novel real-effort experiment with a
distinct moral dilemma. Subjects in this experiment representing
experts are asked to provide proofreading services to another
group of subjects (customers). The quality of the expert’s edits
affects the customer, positively if the edits are done properly and
negatively if they are done incorrectly. However, the quality of
edits has no impact on the expert’s personal earnings. Therefore,
the experts face a moral dilemma between maximizing personal
earnings and providing benefits to their customer.
Behavior in moral dilemmas is hypothesized to be influenced
not only by subjects’ induced payoff function and preferences
for monetary rewards, but also in other-regarding preferences,
subject’s cognitive capabilities, values and personality traits
(Bowles, 1998; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Therefore, we
combine observed behavior from our primary experiment, a
real-effort moral dilemma task, with the individuals’ measures
of the CPCIS to see how individual characteristics relate to an
individual’s actions.
Our results provide several new insights concerning
experiments with a moral dilemma. Initially, we find that simple
correlational analysis provides an incomplete explanation of
how individual measures relate to behavior. Both measures
of preferences and other individual characteristics fail to
consistently correlate with actions in our main experimental
task. For example, measures of individual preferences (i.e.,
risk aversion, loss aversion, and time preferences) are not
correlated with observed actions in the primary experiment. In
contrast, some measures of strategic preferences, intelligence,
and personality are significantly correlated with behavior.
However, in spite of the inconsistency in correlation across
individual preferences and behavior, that fact that some
measures do correlate is of note. When a subject’s preferences
are characterized by a combination of factors such as personality,
cognitive capabilities, and intelligence, as in our primary
experiment, predictions of behavior become uncertain. For
instance, subjects with high measures of intelligence should
produce higher outcomes for their customers, whereas those
same individuals may have varying levels of altruism also
influencing their behavior and, thereby, theoretical predictions.
This leads us to explore individuals by behavioral groups,
also known as clusters. Clusters are identified using the action
variables “total edits” and “total incorrect edits.” Cluster analysis
based on these two variables allows us to distinguish between
subjects who edited a lot with a high percentage of incorrect
edits (the Demons) and subjects who edited sparsely with
a high percentage of incorrect edits, as well as those who
edited few with a high percentage of correct edits (Angels).
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Behavioral group members exhibited systematic differences in
their individual characteristics. We found significant differences
among behavioral groups that could not be detected using simple
correlation analysis, suggesting that the effect of psychological,
cognitive, and demographic differences on behavior in trials
with our moral dilemma experiment is nonlinear. These results
indicate a need for more comprehensive theory explaining how
different individual characteristics work together.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND INDIVIDUAL
DATA
Experimental Design
The primary experimental design was introduced by Green
(2014). The experimental design and data analyzed here are from
Bejarano et al. (2016). Green’s original experiment was designed
to explore behavior between an expert and customer where the
expert is presented with a moral dilemma. Experts are asked
to provide proofreading services for a panel of customers. The
quality of the expert’s proofreading services affects the customer’s
wellbeing (in the form of monetary payment); however, the
customer’s wellbeing has no impact on the expert’s personal
earnings. Therefore, the experts are faced with a tradeoff between
maximizing personal earnings and providing benefits for their
customer.
The interaction between the expert and the customer took
place in two phases with one group of subjects playing the role
of the customer (Phase I) and another group playing the role
of the expert (Phase II). In Phase I, customers were given 50
min to proofread 10 essays. Each essay had 10 typographical or
spelling errors (e.g., misuse of “their” for “there” or “write” for
“right”). Customers were initially endowed with $25; however,
for each error they were unable to find, they lost $0.25. Phase I
was designed to create customer demand for the proofreading
services provided in Phase II of the experiment.
In Phase II, experts were presented with a panel of 40
customer-edited essays collected in phase I. These essays
contained a total of 125 errors. To create the expert subjects,
errors were highlighted when presented to the “experts.” In
addition to the 125 errors that were highlighted, another 250
sections of text were highlighted to create a potential for over-
editing.
There were three possible payment schemes for the expert:
fee-for-service, capitation, or salary. Under fee-for-service, experts
were paid $0.20 per individual field of text edited. Under
salary, experts were paid a flat rate of $25 to participate in the
experiment. Under capitation, experts were paid $0.625 for each
essay in which they edited at least one highlighted section of
the text. The expert’s edits directly impacted the payoff of their
customer. For each incorrect edit, the experts made to the text,
customers lost $0.15 and for each correct edit, customers are
reimbursed $0.05.
Each payment scheme presented a different moral dilemma;
that is, strategies to maximize personal earnings or minimize
effort varied across payment schemes. Under fee-for-service,
experts faced a tradeoff between maximizing the number of edits
and the quality of each edit for their customers. Under salary,
experts faced a tradeoff between leaving the experiments early
(minimizing effort) and providing services for their customers.1
Experts paid under capitation faced a tradeoff between the
number of customers and the quality of edits for each customer.
In addition to varying the payment scheme, we also varied
the expert’s ability to select among the payment schemes.
Our experiment included two treatments. Under the first,
self-selection, experts could choose among the three payment
schemes. Under the second, random assignment, experts were
randomly assigned to one of the three payment systems: fee-for-
service, capitation, or salary.
In Green (2014), subjects were randomly assigned to these
payment schemes. Consistent with experts randomly assigned
in the present analysis, experts in the fee-for-service treatment
provided significantly more services than those in either the
capitation or salary treatments. This difference was caused by a
significant increase in the number of unnecessary edits to the
essays provided by the experts, resulting in a much lower quality
of service under the fee-for-service option compared to the salary
or capitation payment schemes.
The Chapman Preferences and
Characteristics Instrument Set (CPCIS)
Starting in September 2015, the ESI required all subjects to
complete the CPCIS prior to participating in ESI experiments.
This instrument set required about 90 min of a subject’s time
and was run independently of any other experiment, at a
time convenient to the subject. The data collected by this
instrument set consisted of standardized measures of preferences
and individual characteristics gleaned from a series of classic
simple experiments and questionnaires.
Measures are calculated for and sorted into five characteristic
categories: individual preferences, strategic preferences,
intelligence, personality tasks, and demographic characteristics.
Individual preferences measured in the CPCIS include time
preferences, loss aversion, and risk aversion. Strategic preferences
include trust (adapted from Berg et al., 1995), fairness (adapted
from Güth et al., 1982), and altruism (adapted from Kahneman
et al., 1986).
Intelligence is measured using classic psychology measures
from Raven, the CRT, and Wonderlic. Additionally, subjects are
asked to complete a simple adding task, once with incentives for
correctness and once with none. Social intelligence is measured
using The Reading the Mind in The Eyes task. Finally, subjects
provided self-reported measures of intelligence via their SAT and
ACT scores, as well as their GPA. Personality was measured using
the Big Five personality test. Demographic variables included age,
gender, volunteer hours per week, work hours per week, number
of siblings, number of older siblings, and finally, religiosity.
Although, the tests used are somewhat arbitrary and
controversial, the results predict behavior in traditional
experimental games and are consistent with several behavioral
1Subjects who completed their task before the time was up were asked to raise their
hand and were then given a short survey to complete silently. Once finished with
the survey, subjects quietly exited the room andwere paid outside of the laboratory.
We found no session effects.
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and experimental-economics studies that attempt to elicit
relevant preferences. The goal of the CPCIS is to provide a panel
dataset that includes the personality indicators most used by
experimental economists, with indicators used by psychologists,
sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists.
In order to integrate several traditional tasks within the same
instrument set, tasks within CPCIS such as Raven, The Reading
the Mind in The Eyes task and Wonderlic (Test, 1992) were
truncated. Specifically, the CPCIS contained the odd-numbered
questions from the last three series of matrices within the Raven
test (Jaeggi et al., 2010), one that has also been used by Corgnet
et al. (2015). Our Big Five questionnaire is based on the 44 items
described by John et al. (2008). Conversely, we used an extended
version of the CRT (Frederick, 2005). While the original task
from Frederick (2005) has three questions, our task has seven
questions (Toplak et al., 2011).
In addition to traditional games that elicit several types of
other-regarding preferences, the CPCIS includes an instrument
that elicits social preferences a la Bartling et al. (2009), hereafter
referred to as the BFMS task. This task has been used to
study preferences of subjects who self-select into competitive
tasks (Bartling et al., 2009), as well as the relationship between
cognitive capabilities and other-regarding preferences (Corgnet
et al., 2015). In our experiment, we combine features of these
two applications. Selection into a payment scheme is not based
on competitiveness but tradeoffs between the desire to reimburse
others and to maximize personal earnings. Therefore, we argue
that selection into the different treatments could be related
to social preferences elicited by the BFMS. In the following
paragraphs, we briefly describe the BFMS that the students in the
CPCIS faced2.
The BFMS instrument is a series of binary choices with
different allocations for the decision maker and a randomly
matched partner (Table 1). Each choice presents an egalitarian
alternative and a non-egalitarian alternative. In our modified
BFMS instrument, subjects have to make six choices. Of these
six choices, three present subjects with a choice between
an egalitarian alternative and another non-egalitarian division
earnings, which is at least as good or favorable for herself but
detrimental for the matched partner (choices BFMS1, BFMS2,
and BFMS5). In contrast, two of the other three binary choices
presented to the subject ask her to choose between the egalitarian
alternative and a division that is as least as favorable for
the matched partner but less than or equal for the decision
maker (BFMS3, BFMS6). Finally, BFMS4 is welfare-improving
or increases overall earnings but by a greater amount for the
matched partner.
In the CPCIS, after all of the subjects made their decisions,
two of the individuals were randomly selected to have their
choices determine the earnings for this task. Models describing
behavior observed in the BFMS task vary across publications.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) presented a two-parameter α, β model,
2It is not within the scope of this article to describe each task in the CPCIS in detail.
Most of the tasks included in the CPCIS have been used in several experiments. In
this case, wemake an exception for the BFMS, assuming that it is not as well-known
as the other tasks. Still, we encourage the reader to read Bartling et al. (2009) and
Corgnet et al. (2015) for more detailed descriptions of this type of instrument.
where α represents aversion to disadvantageous inequality,
Behindness Aversion, and β aversion to advantageous inequality,
Aheadness Aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumed that α >
β > 0. In contrast, Corgnet et al. (2015) related these parameters
to envy and compassion and did not impose any assumption
on them. The authors summarized five motivations that could
make subjects select one alternative over the other. These
include self-interest, altruism, egalitarianism, spitefulness, and
inequality-seeking. The authors also said that individuals could
have a combination of these motives while choosing among
alternatives. In order to organize BFMS choices in a way useful
for our analysis, we further simplified the choices within three
types of preferences. Decision makers who chose alternative
A more often across all six choices demonstrated egalitarian
preferences. Decision makers who chose to allocate larger
earnings to their matched partner than to themselves (alternative
A in BFMS3, BFMS4, and BFMS5) at no cost or a small cost to
their own earnings, were considered altruistic or averse to being
ahead of their partner. Finally, decision makers who were more
likely to choose option A in BFMS1, BFMS2, and BFMS5 were
considered Spiteful. These individuals could also be considered
as having demonstrated aversion to being behind their
partner.
Based on these notions, we constructed three variables based
on the BFMS choices for each individual. Each individual
could choose between zero and six egalitarian alternatives
(Egalitarianism). Also, they could choose between zero and three
beneficial alternatives (Selfishness) or detrimental alternatives
(Altruism). These three variables elaborate on the theory of other-
regarding preferences and improve our understanding of how a
subject’s choices under this instrument relate to their actions in
our moral dilemma experiment.
We do not claim that the measures obtained by these
truncated tasks mirror those obtained by the original tests,
but for the purpose of our analysis, we determine the extent
to which these measures are correlated with the experimental
actions.
THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG
CPCIS VARIABLES
In this section, we analyze the theoretical implications of
expert preferences and characteristics. Two experimental-design
features are important for our analysis. First, an expert in the self-
selection treatment likely reveals something about her personal
preferences in her selection of payment systems. Experts who are
randomly assigned to their payment scheme will be the average
of the general student population, rather than the conditional
averages for the subject types that prefer a particular payment
scheme. We will distinguish between these two groups in our
predictions.
Second, the quality of the expert’s proofreading directly
impacted the customer’s payment. But it had no impact on the
expert’s personal earnings. In the choice of a payment scheme,
all experts in the self-selection treatment faced the same tradeoff,
or moral dilemma, between choosing the payment scheme that
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TABLE 1 | Bartling binary choice task.
Binary choice variable name Egalitarian alternative A Non-egalitarian alternative B
BFMS1 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns $10, Matched Partner $6
BFMS2 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns $16, Matched Partner $4
BFMS3 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns $10, Matched Partner $18
BFMS4 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns, $11 Matched Partner $19
BFMS5 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns, $12 Matched Partner $4
BFMS6 Both subjects earn $10 Decision-Maker earns $8, Matched Partner $16
would maximize personal earnings or one that would limit their
maximum earnings. Therefore, selecting a payment scheme may
reveal something about subjects’ characteristics.
The following ceteris paribus predictions highlight the
expected relationship between each individual characteristics and
behavior in the primary experiment. However, we note that
individuals do not differ from each other in ceteris paribus ways;
therefore theoretical implications are unlikely to describe the
expected differences in behavior among any two given subjects.
Predicted Behavior with Homo
Economicus Preferences
The predicted behavior varies with assumptions about expert
preferences that are not induced. However, there are simple
predictions for the outcomes of these experiments if we assume
subjects prefer to be purely self-interested (homo economicus).
If careful editing requires bearing a real-effort or cognitive cost,
a homo economicus expert assigned to the salary scheme will
exert no effort and conduct no edits. A homo economicus expert
randomly assigned to the capitation scheme should exert the
minimum effort and only conduct one edit per essay. A homo
economicus expert assigned to fee-for-service shouldmaximize the
number of edits with minimum effort and make both necessary
and unnecessary edits. Furthermore, in the selection treatment,
homo economicus would select fee-for-service 100% of the time,
because under that scheme, experts can earn three times more
than the maximum earnings possible under salary or capitation.
However, the experimental evidence presented in Green
(2014) and Bejarano et al. (2016) demonstrates that subjects
deviated from income-maximizing strategies. These results
suggest that subject preferences were more complex than those
of homo economicus. This leads us to investigate what role
additional preferences might be in play in order to modify
our assumptions regarding the effects of the payoff schemes on
actions.
Predicted Behavior with Other Preferences
and Choice-Relevant Characteristics
The experimental design has some implications concerning the
relevance of other personal characteristics as well. For example,
risk aversion, loss aversion, and time preferences should not affect
behavior. Subjects earnings do not depend on the correctness of
their editing but only on their payment system and their decision
to edit or not. Payments are deterministic. Therefore, subjects do
not face risks of the usual kind. Similarly, the effect of choice on
earnings is almost immediate; hence, time preferences should not
influence choices.
On the other hand, a subject’s actions in Phase II have
an impact on the earnings of subjects who participated on
Phase I. Therefore, we expect that measures of what might
be regarded as social preferences should affect behavior. For
example, differences in the extent of altruism is likely to affect
behavior, as has been found in Dictator, Trust, Ultimatum Game,
and Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments. We expect measures of
altruism to be positively correlated with efforts to help subjects
in Phase I. Error rates should fall under fee-for-service, and
more time (and care) should be spent editing under salary and
capitation.
The three variables described above (Egalitarianism,
Selfishness, Altruism) have an intrinsic relationship with
what we expect to uncover with the selection and related
actions in our experiment. We expect that those demonstrating
Selfishness through these measures will prioritize their earnings
over their customers’. Hence, these subjects will likely select
fee-for-service and perform a larger number of edits rather than
maximize their incomes, even at the expense of their customer.
In contrast, those individuals that prioritize the earnings of their
matched partners will likely choose salary and only attempt to
conduct beneficial edits for the customers, even at a cognitive
and time cost to themselves.
In contrast to the preference measures, predictions regarding
Intelligence and demographic variables are not clear. Little
is known regarding how actions in our experiment will
be influenced by a subject’s demographic characteristics. We
also have variables that reflect Numeracy, Academic, and IQ
Intelligence. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that researchers aimed to explore how these measures correlate
with performance on incentivized linguistic tasks that affect third
parties.
Cognitive Capabilities and Personality
In this section, we clarify the implications that cognitive
capabilities and personality traits could have on the behavior
observed in our primary experiment given their indirect
relationship with strategic preferences. In a novel study, Corgnet
et al. (2015) found that Chapman students with a more reflective
nature were less likely than intuitive individuals to be associated
with egalitarian and spiteful motives. The authors named the
behavior of those with scores above median CRT as mildly
altruistic. Given that we have access to the same subject database
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with the same measures of cognitive capability (CRT) and
preferences for egalitarianism or spitefulness (Bartling et al.,
2009), we might expect also that subjects with higher CRTs
would show some type of characteristic behavior. However,
it is not clear what exactly would comprise mildly altruistic
behavior in our experiment. The moral dilemma at hand
implies that for each treatment, experts face a different tradeoff
between self-interest and customer welfare. We expect subjects
with higher CRT scores to be more likely to balance this
tradeoff differently in the various treatments examined because
they are more likely to reflect on the cost of the tradeoff at
stake.
In an attempt to relate personality traits to preferences
measures, Rustichini et al. (2012) used a dataset with 1000
truck drivers. They measured the truck drivers’ Big Five traits,
time preference, risk aversion, truck accidents, job persistence,
credit score, and body mass index (BMI). The authors found
that personality traits had stronger predictive power than time
preferences or risk aversion for truck accidents, job persistence,
credit score, and BMI. However, the authors argue that both
economic and psychological theories are needed to understand
truck-driver behavior.
Big Five personality traits are also likely to help explain
differences in the behavior of experts among treatments and
payment systems. Unfortunately, the Big Five factors are not
orthogonal. Although, qualitative predictions can often be
made for individual factors, a person’s particular vector of
factors often includes factors with the opposite effects on
the behavior of interest. For example, openness is associated
with curiosity and a higher willingness to explore. Therefore,
relatively open individuals might be more likely to conduct
a larger number of edits and to spend more time on
them.
Conscientiousness is associated with being dependable
and disciplined. In our experiment, experts have a mission.
In their mission, they know that they could affect the
earnings of their customers. Higher conscientiousness is likely
to be correlated positively with measures of correct edits.
Agreeableness is associated with higher cooperation against
the exploitation of others (Andersen et al., 2006). We expect
that subjects with higher agreeableness should conduct more
correct edits to increase the earnings of customers. These three
dispositions, therefore, tend to induce better outcomes for the
customers.
Higher extroversion is associated with higher sensitivity to
rewards. In this case, the perceived nature of the reward matters.
Subjects with a higher extroversion measure (maintaining the
degree of preferences for others’ welfare) may be driven by
monetary rewards. In that case, they will be more likely to choose
fee-for-service and to conduct unnecessary edits. However, if they
perceive their reward to be correlated with the benefits of their
customers, extroverts will take greater account of such effects
than introverts.
Finally, neuroticism appears to be the factor that is not likely
to influence the behavior of subjects in a clearly predictive
way. Because the experimental environment is set up to isolate
subjects from situations where moods, anxiety, and depression
play a significant role, we do not expect to find any significant
correlation between neuroticism and behavior.
EXPERIMENT, DATA, AND ANALYSIS
The experiments were conducted in the ESI laboratory and
conference rooms at Chapman University between May 2014
and May 2016. Experimental subjects were recruited from the
ESI database of more than 2000 students. Phase I was conducted
either in the ESI laboratory or the ESI conference room. Phase
II was conducted in the ESI’s computer laboratories. Printed
instructions were provided for the students to read on their
own for 10 min. At the end of the 10 min, the experimental
coordinator read the instructions out loud. Subjects were not
able to start the experiment until they satisfactorily completed a
quiz.
Many of these subjects were also recruited to participate
in the CPCIS by a different recruitment email on a previous
date convenient to the subject’s schedule. The CPCIS sessions
were implemented in the same laboratory but had no formal
connection to any other experiments being conducted at ESI. The
local Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved both studies. In
both studies, participants received a show-up fee of 7 USD plus
additional incentive payments earned by their behavior in the
session.
In the primary experiment, there was a total of 20
undergraduates (customers) recruited in Phase I and 228
undergraduates (experts) recruited in Phase II. In Phase II,
which was dedicated to experts performing editing services, 105
subjects were randomly assigned to their payment scheme, and
125 selected their payment scheme. Of the subjects in Phase II,
161 had completed the CPCIS; 115 of those were in the self-
selection treatment and the other 46 were randomly assigned to
one of the three payment schemes. We focus our analysis below
on the behavior of those 161 subjects who participated in the
primary experiment and had undertaken the CPCIS. The primary
experiment lasted an average of 1 h and 15 min, and completion
of the CPCIC instrument required an average of 1 h and 35 min.
In the primary experiment, expert subjects could edit correctly
or incorrectly. We will focus our analysis on six experimental
actions: total edits, total incorrect edits, percentage wrong, net
impact on the customer earnings, expert earnings, and total
editing time taken. Total edits (total incorrect) is the sum of all
(incorrect) edits made by the expert over four rounds of editing.
Percentage wrong was calculated by dividing total incorrect by
total edited. Cumulative impact on the customer earnings, or
impact, was calculated as the customer payoff generated by the
expert’s behavior over all four rounds. As subjects were given the
opportunity to leave the experiment early, total time taken is the
amount of time the experts spent editing the essays across all four
rounds.
Table 2 provides a summary of the actions taken in
the different treatments. As discussed in Bejarano et al.
(2016), experts preferred either fee-for-service or salary over
capitation. Those subjects who self-selected fee-for-service
provided significantly more edits than those randomly assigned,
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resulting in more earnings for themselves and less help for
their customers. The observed behavior between the randomly
assigned salary treatment and those who self-selected salary did
not significantly differ.
We begin with a correlational analysis of the relationship
between subjects’ actions and CPCIS measures. The correlation
analysis only captures the way in which actions correlated with
specific individual’s characteristics. In the second part of this
section, we report the results of a cluster analysis that groups
subjects acting in similar ways. These clusters were most salient
when subjects could self-select into one of the payment schemes.
We analyze whether particular subjects’ behavior or action-
strategy types are revealed by actions in the experiment, and
whether we observe differences across types in the self-selected
treatment. Finally, we analyze how the observed relationships
between experimental actions and CPCIS measures relate to our
theoretical hypotheses.
Correlation Analysis
We start this section by exploring the individual characteristics
across the six experimental subject types: self-selected and
three randomly assigned into either fee-for-service, capitation, or
salary types. When comparing across experimental subject types,
we do not expect to see much difference between individual
characteristics of those subjects that were randomly assigned
individuals to the different payment schemes, because they
were randomly selected from the general subject population. In
contrast, we would expect to see differences in the individual
characteristics of those that self-selected different payment
schemes.
We proceed as follows: First, we study the correlation between
experimental actions and individual characteristics for all those
subjects for whom we have the CPCIS data (A summary of each
of the CPCIS data measure can be found in the Appendix). This
analysis, which includes the pooled set of randomly assigned and
self-selected individuals, should reveal if ceteris paribusmeasures
within a characteristic category are strongly correlated with
actions in a particular way. Second, we use the fact that self-
selecting into different payment schemes might reveal something
about a subject’s type to better understand behavior. Here, we
analyze the correlation between each one of the payment schemes
disaggregated by self-selection and randomly assigned with each
of the individual characteristic measures in the CPCIS data. In
both cases, we estimated the Spearman correlation coefficient3
and test significance correcting for the multiple hypothesis effects
via the Bonferroni adjustment.
In the analysis of the pooled set of subjects, there are two
main findings: First and not surprisingly, variables within a
characteristic category are typically highly correlated with one
another. Second, we did not find any significant correlation
between any of the preference measures and subject actions in
the experimental treatments. The lack of correlation is consistent
with our predictions of individual preferences but surprising for
3The Spearman’s rho is a nonparametric measure of rank correlation. The
assumption of monotonicity in Spearman’s rho test is satisfied.
those measures of strategic preferences, which were hypothesized
to play a role in behavior in our primary experiment.
One exception is the correlation between all BFMS variables,
measures of strategic preference, and action variables in our
primary experiments. Particularly, we observed that when
evaluating the correlation between the pooled data, i.e., all
subjects in all treatments, selfishness correlates positively with
total edited (rs = 0. 185, p < 0.10). Furthermore, in all three
cases, the three variables, egalitarianism, altruism and selfishness,
have significant positive correlation with the amount experts
earned with rs = 0.158, rs = 0.221, and rs = 0.179, and p <
0.10, respectively,. In contrast, altruism is not correlated with
the number of wrong edits or its percentage. Furthermore, both
egalitarianism and selfishness have a positive correlation with the
number of wrong edits (and its percentage) with these respective
statistics, rs = 90.1779, rs = 0.214, and p < 0.05 in both
cases. Accounting for self-selection in general or self-selection
into a particular payment scheme, all these correlations hold
their significance except the correlation between the number of
total edits, which now is not statistically significantly related to
egalitarianism.
We found CRTmeasures correlated with total earnings in two
dimensions: The number of correct CRT answers is positively
correlated with total earnings (rs = 0.2348, rs = 0.3030, p <
0.05), and CRT impulsiveness is negatively correlated with total
earnings (rs = −0.2270, p < 0.10). This result is consistent with
the findings of Corgnet et al. (2015) given that CRT relates to
how compulsive/deliberative subjects are. However, these results
should not be generalized since these traits could affect both the
self-selection and the actions taken by subjects after this choice.
Therefore, the outcome could be either driven by the self-selected
portion of the subjects or not.
The lack of significant correlation between most of our
measures of individual characteristics and subject actions
conflicts with the theoretical hypotheses that we discussed in
the previous section. None of the preference measures were
correlated with any of the experimental action variables. Several
explanations for this result are feasible. One possible explanation
for the lack of correlations is that the CPCIS instrument and
the primary experiment were conducted at different times by
different researchers. This might imply that subjects are less likely
to act in a manner consistent with the behavior characterized
by their responses to the CPCIS tasks while performing in the
primary experiment. Differences in the timing and circumstances
of the CPCIS tasks and the primary experiments imply that their
behavior in the primary experiment is less likely to reflect any
implicit experimenter demand effect.
We continue our analysis by examining only correlations
among those who self-selected the same treatment. This is an
important step in our analysis, as the act of choosing a treatment
might reveal differences in individual characteristics. To analyze
this possibility, we break down the correlation analysis into two
steps. First, we conduct the same correlation analysis as above but
only for those subjects in the self-selection treatment.
Not surprisingly, there is no correlation between experimental
actions and the individual characteristic measures of the CPCIS
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TABLE 2 | Actions summary by treatment.
Variable Randomly assigned Selection
Fee-for-service Salary Capitation Fee-for-service Salary Capitation
Total edited 175.8 81.7 89.2 250.3 85.8 73.8
Total wrong 98.1 7.6 17.6 180.6 13.8 7.0
Total correct 77.8 74.1 71.5 69.7 72.0 66.8
Percentage correct 62% 90% 83% 40% 85% 89%
Cumulative impact 6.8 10.8 9.8 1.1 10.4 9.7
Total earnings $35 $25 $21 $51 $25 $23
Number of subjects 39 41 25 49 70 4
for the subjects that self-selected the two most popular payment
schemes4. The next step in our analysis is to break down the
correlation analysis, controlling for self-selection into a particular
payment scheme, salary or fee-for-service.
The analysis of correlation between subjects that self-selected
a similarmoral dilemma presents twomain findings. First, almost
all the finding of the analysis of the pooled set of a subject’s
data persists. This means that those characteristics that were
not found significantly correlated persisted and presented a lack
of relationship with actions and were still not correlated when
disaggregating by payment scheme. In contrast, we found that
the selection choice may work as a screening device of subjects
with different values for those that were found significant for
all the self-selected subjects. This is reflected by the fact that
accounting for the particular payment schemes eliminates the
significance for those relationships that were significant for the
pooled set of subjects into both payment schemes. This result
holds for all the correlations between actions and individual
characteristics reflected by variables such as egalitarianism,
altruism and selfishness, as well as CRT correct and CRT. This
result could be explained if values for these variables and actions
are similar among those that self-selected salary but very different
for those that self-selected fee for service.
Cluster Analysis
The results of the previous section lead us to believe that
there may be different types of experimental subjects. More
specifically, we argue that the inconsistencies in correlations
between measures of individual characteristics and observed
actions are due to the fact that in our primary experiment
multiple characteristics, i.e., cognitive capabilities, individual
preferences, social preferences and personality traits, might affect
behavior. That is, given the moral dilemma and real effort
features of our primary experiment, we expect that certain
individual characteristics will pull the subject’s behavior in
opposite directions. For example, experts with high measures
of intelligence would be more likely to provide better outcomes
for their customers, whereas low levels of altruism imply
worse outcomes for their customers. Therefore, a subject’s
the combination of the individual characteristics each subject
4Total time taken showed a positive correlation with self-reported GPA (rs =
0.1981, p < 0.10).
possesses may have uncertain implications for theoretical
predictions.
For this reason, we next explore if expert actions reveal
behavioral types and whether behavioral groups correspond
to differences in preference, cognitive, and demographic
characteristics. To do this, we use cluster analysis to build
behavioral groups from the actions of subjects in the selection
treatment of our primary experiment.
Clusters (behavioral groups) are based on a subject’s actions.
Specifically, behavioral groups are created using the action
variables “total edits” and “total incorrect edits.” Cluster analysis
based on these two variables allows us to distinguish between
subjects who edited a lot with a high percentage of incorrect
edits (the Demons) and subjects who edited sparsely with a high
percentage of incorrect edits, as well as those who edited few with
a high percentage of correct edits (the Angels).
Behavioral groups were created using the k-mean algorithm
with Euclidian distances. We clustered on values of k from 2
to 6 and maximized the Calinski and Harabasz (CH) pseudo f-
statistics to find the optimal clustering (Calin´ski and Harabasz,
1974). In order to control for the robustness of the k-mean
algorithm, we ran it in a loop with 50 repetitions for each value of
k. From these repetitions, we selected the cluster with the highest
CH pseudo F-statistic for each value of k. Then, comparing across
the k values, we selected the clustering with the highest CH
pseudo f-statistic.
Behavioral Groups
Figure 1 andTable 3 provide summaries of the cluster groupings.
Table 3 summarizes the experimental actions taken by the typical
member of the five behavioral groups created by our cluster
analysis. The results displayed in Table 3 reveal three things.
First, they reveal that various subjects in our primary experiment
behaved in very different ways. Second, the significant differences
on actions across behavioral groups imply that our cluster
methodology identified different types of subjects. Lastly, a large
part of subject behavior is captured by the subjects’ choices
of payment scheme. The payment scheme selection action
completely and consistently separates the five groups into two
subsets, {A, B, D} and {C, E}. No significant differences exist
between any pair of groups from within either subset, but
significant differences do exist between any pair of groups across
subsets.
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FIGURE 1 | K mean cluster analysis.
TABLE 3 | Actions summary by group.
Variable Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
Total edited 370 328 37 182 101
Total wrong 347 241 6 99 13
Total correct 23 87 31 83 88
Percentage correct 6% 26% 80% 46% 87%
Cumulative impact −14 2 5 7 12
Total earnings $74 $63 $24 $36 $25
Percentage fee-for-service 100% 93% 5% 90% 21%
Number of subjects 13 14 19 10 63
However, payment choice does not capture all the dimensions
of subject behavior. Figure 1 reveals that even for those groups
with a large percentage of subjects choosing the fee-for-service
payment scheme (Groups A, B, and D), behavior varied
significantly. And although amuch smaller percentage of subjects
chose the fee-for-service payment scheme, Groups C and E also
displayed dissimilar behavior in other dimensions. For example,
although Group E has a large number of subjects choosing salary
rather than the fee -for-service, the fee -for-service subjects of
Group E (the Angels) behaved very different than fee-for-service
subjects in Groups A, B and D and, in particular, most different
from those in Group A (the Demons).
The experimental actions from our primary experiment show
strong support for the existence of behavioral types as revealed
in Table 3 and Figure 1. In the spirit of the ongoing claims
in various fields of behavioral science, we seek to determine
whether the differences in primary experimental behavior relate
to individual characteristics that may be captured independently
TABLE 4 | Summary of FPRANK comparisons across groups and
individual preferences.
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
Group A – 6 5 4 3
Group B 6 – 7 5 7
Group C 5 7 – 6 4
Group D 4 5 6 – 2
Group E 3 7 4 2 –
Totals 18 25 22 17 16
% of Total 13% 18% 16% 13% 12%
by the CPCIS database. Understanding this question is of great
importance to experimental research.
In order to test the hypotheses that there are no differences in
the individual characteristics of students who have been clustered
into different groups, we perform a binary comparison of the
aggregate experimental actions taken by subjects in each pair of
groups for each CPCIS characteristic. The complete results for
the Two Sample Fligner–Policello Rank Test are displayed in
Table 5. Table 4 provides a summary of these results by reporting
the count of the number of CPCIS characteristics in which each
pair of behavioral groups differed significantly.
Although, all the groups were formed by Chapman students,
each group displayed at least 2 and up to 9 significant
differences in the characteristics of its membership. There were
26 characteristic differences that reinforced the basic subdivision
({A, B, D}, {C, E}) that was revealed by payment selection, but
there were 23 characteristic differences between groups within
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TABLE 5 | Summary statistics of action and individual characteristics.
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
Variable Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES
Risk aversion 4.00 3 – 4.15 2 >3 4.00 3 <2 3.90 4 – 4.18 1 –
Loss aversion 3.38 3 – 3.15 5 <1 3.28 4 – 3.90 1 >5 3.46 2 –
Time preference 6.00 2 – 6.23 1 – 4.94 5 – 5.30 4 – 5.74 3 –
STRATEGIC PREFERENCES
Trust
Trust sent 7.69 2 – 8.46 1 – 6.11 3 – 6.00 4 – 7.37 3 –
Trust return 13.08 1 >4, 3 10.38 4 <1 13.06 2 >3 9.00 3 <1, 2 12.46 3 –
Ultimatum
Offer 4.85 5 – 5.69 2 – 5.11 4 – 5.70 1 – 5.44 3 –
First accepted offer 3.92 1 – 3.62 4 – 3.67 3 – 3.80 2 – 3.49 5 –
Advantageous offers 0.00 4 – 0.31 2 – 0.50 1 – 0.50 1 – 0.05 3 –
Dictator
Sent 4.31 4 <2 5.62 1 – 5.44 2 >1, 3 4.30 5 – 4.70 3 <1
Prisoners’ dilemma
Cooperative action 1.54 1 >4 1.23 4 <1 1.50 2 1.50 2 – 1.39 3 –
Bartling
Egalitarianism 3.54 1 >5 3.07 4 – 3.21 2 >5 2.70 5 <1, 2 3.11 3 –
Altruism 0.92 5 – 1.50 1 – 1.26 3 – 1.40 2 – 1.17 4 –
Selfishness 1.54 2 >5 1.00 5 <2, 1 1.21 3 <1 1.90 1 >5, 3, 4 1.14 4 <1
INTELLIGENCE
Psychology
Raven 13.69 1 – 13.15 3 – 12.17 4 – 12.60 5 – 13.16 2 –
CRT 3.23 2 – 4.08 1 >5 2.67 5 <1 3.10 4 – 3.18 3 –
Wonderlic 19.77 3 – 20.23 1 >5 18.94 5 <1, 2 20.20 2 >5 19.54 4 –
Numeracy
Adding task (Incentivized) 15.38 4 – 17.54 1 >5 14.78 5 <1 16.60 2 – 16.05 3 –
Adding task (Not Incentivized) 13.85 4 <1 17.08 1 >4, 5 12.83 5 <1, 2, 3 16.80 2 >5 15.21 3 >5
Academic
SAT 5.15 4 – 5.38 2 >5 5.29 3 – 5.40 1 – 4.96 5 <2
ACT 6.42 1 – 6.23 2 – 5.82 5 – 5.89 4 – 6.00 3 –
GPA 3.61 2 >5 3.72 1 >5, 3 3.41 5 <2, 1, 3 3.45 4 – 3.56 3 <1, >5
Social
Theory of mind 27.69 1 – 27.30 2 – 26.41 5 – 26.50 4 – 27.02 3 –
PERSONALITY-BIG 5
Openness 36.54 4 – 39.08 1 – 36.94 3 – 36.40 5 – 37.28 2 –
Conscientiousness 30.77 5 – 32.23 2 – 32.06 3 – 31.10 4 – 32.51 1 –
Extroversion 28.08 1 >4 26.85 3 – 27.28 2 – 26.60 4 <1 25.86 5 –
Agreeableness 31.77 4 <3, 2, 1 31.54 5 <1, 2 33.72 3 >4 35.20 1 >4, 5 34.49 2 >4, 5
Neuroticism 25.85 1 >4, 5 24.08 2 – 21.50 4 <1 20.00 5 <1, 3 23.61 3 >5
DEMOGRAPHICS
Age 18.85 4 – 18.62 5 <1 18.89 3 – 18.90 2 – 19.23 1 >5
Gender 1.54 2 – 1.43 5 – 1.53 3 – 1.60 1 – 1.44 4
Volunteer hours 1.15 5 <1 1.67 1 >3, 4, 5 1.47 3 <1 1.22 4 <1 1.49 2
Work hours 1.46 5 <1 2.25 1 >3, 4, 5 1.76 3 <1 1.89 2 – 1.60 4 <1
Number of siblings 1.23 4 <1 1.15 5 – 1.56 2 – 1.50 3 <1 1.91 1 >3, 4
Older siblings 0.77 4 – 0.46 5 <3 0.83 3 >5, <1 1.10 1 >3 0.88 2 –
Religiosity 1.67 3 – 1.54 4 <1 1.41 5 <2 1.90 2 >5 2.04 1 >4
Subjects who chose the capitation payment were not able to be clustered into a group. Their data is not summarized here.
Significance in ranking reported by < or > signs next to ranking.
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the same subset; this allows us to differentiate between groups
that have a similar predilection for payment scheme.
Table 5 displays the differences among those individual
characteristics for each group. For each variable in the CPCIS,
we provide the information of the mean at the group level
and the number of subjects in the group. We also rank them
from the highest (1) to the lowest (5) value and the sign for
those differences that were statistically significant according to
the results of the binary Two Sample Fligner–Policello Rank
Test. We next describe how the results in Table 5 relate to
the theoretical implications discussed in Section Theoretical
Relationship among CPCIS Variables.
Individual Preferences
In contrast to the correlation analysis where no measures of
individual preferences were significantly different, risk aversion,
and loss aversion were each significantly different between two
groups (Groups B > C and Group D > Group B, respectively).
This is surprising as experts’ risk aversion and loss aversion
profiles should not affect their behavior as the subjects are in
control of their actions and thereby, their earnings. However,
these results cannot be rationalized by either a non-egocentric
egocentric view of preferences over other’s risk and loss (Hsee and
Weber, 1997). If we consider each action as a choice between an
uncertain outcome (i.e., edit is potentially right or wrong) and a
certain outcome (i.e., no edit means no risk) for their counterpart,
the number of edits conducted would reflect one’s risk aversion.
However, Group C behaved more conservatively in editing than
Group B, whereas Group C is less risk averse than Group B. In
contrast, Group B had lower levels of loss aversion than Group
D and conducted significantly more edits than Group D. This
demonstrates Group B’s willingness to act carelessly in decisions
that negatively impact others more so than the behavior of Group
D. These results provide a first indication of how difficult it
is to relate measures of individual preference to behavior in a
real-effort moral dilemma.
Strategic Preference
In contrast to the correlation analysis, more measures of strategic
preferences were found to be significantly different. First, we
predicted that subjects with higher levels of reciprocity would act
more benevolently than others in our primary task; that is, these
subjects would provide a higher cumulative impact (income)
for their customers. However, we found that when comparing
the actions in the Trust Game (reciprocity), groups with high
levels of reciprocity were less benevolent to their customers. For
example, groups that provided a large number of incorrect edits,
such as Group A (the Demons), or relatively few edits, such as
Group C, had higher rankings of reciprocity, i.e., returned more
money on the trust game. However, it is important to note that
in the Trust Game, reciprocity from the recipient is conditional
whereas, in our experiment, expert actions toward customers
are not. In our primary experiment, the benefits experts confer
to their customers do not affect their own earnings. This key
distinction may explain the unexpected behavior.
BFMS measures of egalitarianism, selfishness or altruism also
partly contradict our theoretical predictions. Groups A and C
had significantly larger measures of egalitarianism in the BFMS
relative to the other groups; however, in our experiment Group
A’s actions reflect those of homo economicus and Group C’s
reflected those of an egalitarian. Group C has the lowest overall
personal earnings and the 3rd highest cumulative impact for
their customer. A similar relationship appears with measures
of selfishness reported by the BFMS. Groups A and C are
among those with higher levels of selfishness. The inconsistency
in behavior and similarity of BFMS measures in these two
Groups leads us to question the usual interpretation of the BFMS
measure.
Intelligence
We found that 6 of our 9 measures of intelligence differed
across groups. In contrast to the simple correlation analysis,
the different behavioral groups were not drawn from the same
population with respect to the CRT and Wonderlic test results.
For the CRT we found that Group B, the group with the highest
CRT values, also behaved in a way that could be described as
mildly altruistic and selfish. Group B mostly opted for fee-for-
service and conducted a large number of edits, thereby increasing
their earnings. However, relative to Group A, who also provided
a large number of edits, Group B provided more accurate edits.
This behavior we characterize as mildly altruistic and selfish, and
it is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Similar results
were observed by Corgnet et al. (2015). Corgnet et al. observed in
their experiments that individuals with high CRT scores behave
in a more altruistic way.
Our final measure of intelligence that had significant
differences across groups is by numeracy both in an incentivized
task and not incentivized. In our theoretical predictions, we
argue that there is no relationship between numeracy and the
task in our primary experiment. However, upon reflection,
statistically significant differences on the not incentivized Adding
Task would not contradict our predictions. Notice, that this
CPCIS task measures more than numeracy skills, as subjects
are not presented with any monetary incentive to add correctly.
Therefore, the correct additions performed in this task is also a
measure of intrinsic motivation. Hence, finding that those who
groups with the highest number of correct edits (Groups B,
D, and E) also have the highest scores on the not incentivized
Adding Task is as one would expect.
Personality
Table 5 reveals that the behavioral groups differ with regard to
at least three personality measures (Extroversion, Agreeableness,
and Neuroticism). Two measures, however, Openness and
Conscientiousness, are not statistically different among groups.
The finding that Conscientiousness does not differ amongst
groups regardless of choice of payment contradicts our
theoretical discussion. However, we do find two supporting
results. First, Group A (the Demons) has higher levels of
extroversion. This group is only composed of subjects that chose
fee-for-service; it conducted the most edits on average and had
the lowest percentage of correct edits, all of which are consistent
with an extrovert’s attitude toward rewards. Second, Groups
D and E showed the highest values of Agreeableness. These
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two groups also had higher cumulative impact (the return of
dollars to customers as a result of their actions). This result is
consistent with the compassionated attitude associated with this
trait. Finally, we also found that Neuroticism differs significantly
among groups. Particularly, Groups A, B, and D, the three
groups with the largest numbers of edits, presented higher values
of Neuroticism than the Groups with lower numbers of edits,
Groups C and E.
Demographics
Several demographic characteristics presented significant
differences amongst groups. Of particular interest to our analysis
are self-reported numbers of volunteer and work hours. Again,
Group B ranked the highest for these two variables. We have
already described the behavior of Group B as mildly altruistic
and selfish, so it is encouraging that the results are consistent
with our previous finding.
DISCUSSION
In general, understanding how individual characteristics
influence behavior is a fundamental task of the economist,
psychologist, and scientist. While crucial, scientists rarely
have independent datasets that combine both an individual
subject’s characteristics and behavior (Caplan, 2003). In this
article, we leverage a uniquely large dataset containing the
individual characteristics of a subset of our experimental subjects
to shed light on the relationship between subject’s individual
characteristics and their behavior in a real-effort moral dilemma
with self-selection by payment scheme. Due to the unique nature
of our primary experiment, we use two statistical approaches,
correlation analysis and cluster analysis, to better understand
these dynamics. Different scholars collected our two datasets at
different times for different reasons. This allowed us to avoid
issues associated with a sequence of primary and secondary
experiments conducted by the same experimental team and
setting. The following points summarize our results.
First, there is no clear majority of individual characteristics
that correlate with behavior in our primary experiment. A set
of a few, but interesting, significant correlation relationships
were found across experimental actions. We found that no
measure of individual preference, i.e., time discounting, risk
and loss aversion, was significant. Furthermore, our measures
of strategic preferences, which include variables such as Trust,
Trustworthiness, and Altruism captured from implementation
of canonical Trust and Ultimatum Games also failed to show
any significant correlation with actions in a real-effort moral
dilemma. These results highlight the importance of conducting
reliability tests for simple statistical analyses exploring these
social preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002). Other measures
of social preferences, such as those derived from Bartling
et al. (2009), were significantly correlated with actions, but the
results of these correlations were contradictory to our theoretical
predictions.
Measures of intelligence and personality traits also often failed
to correlate with observed behavior in our primary experiment.
This result is consistent with previous findings (Becker et al.,
2012) and presents an additional call to a better development
in the study of the relationship between personality traits and
economic behavior (Almlund et al., 2011; Rustichini et al., 2012).
Hence, there is a need for replication of this investigation to
develop better theoretical models (Benjamin et al., 2013).
There are several arguments that may justify these
inconsistencies. First, ordering of tasks has been shown to
impact outcomes in experiments. For instance, Healy et al.
(2016) demonstrates that by going from a single shot of a game
to a repeated game, subjects’ payment functions change and
thereby, so do behaviors. Similarly, implementing a sequence of
tasks, primary and secondary, or a battery of tasks and surveys,
as with the CPCIS, could induce different behavior through
wealth and portfolio effects. Here, we analyze the correlation
between a single task (our primary experiment) and a battery
of instruments (the CPCIS), collected on separate occasions.
Therefore, behavior in our primary experiment should be less
affected by the behavior of the CPCIS than if both datasets had
been collected in the same session, producing less consistent
correlations than otherwise.
Secondly, it is possible that the joint implementation of
tasks in the CPCIS dataset generate spurious correlations. These
spurious correlations could be generated from the bundling of
experimental tasks, experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010),
or idiosyncratic effects of experimenter teams or their lab set
up. For instance, researchers often only conduct secondary
experiments that they believe will reveal something about
their subjects. This potentially introduces an experimenter
demand effect instead of the desired elicitation of additional
characteristics, resulting in spurious correlations. We argue that
the difficulty of finding significant correlations in our analysis,
when both of the datasets were collected by separate research
teams, is a call for attention to the interpretation of correlations
found between primary experiments and secondary measures
that are jointly collected. Furthermore, these findings open
several research questions regarding how to implement and
analyze the results of several experimental tasks, which a priori
are correlated.
Following the correlation analysis, we found that actions in
a primary experiment could be used to categorize subjects into
groups based on their observed actions using cluster analysis (i.e.,
behavioral groups). Furthermore, because of the availability of
the CPCIS data we could proceed one step further than several
experiments, which have already utilized cluster analysis with the
investigation of individual characteristics (Houser et al., 2004;
Rong and Houser, 2015).
The cluster analysis reveals that individual characteristics
are a distinguishing factor across behavioral groups. Individual
measures of preferences (Risk and Loss aversion), strategic
preferences (Trust Game, Dictator Game, Prisoners’ Dilemman,
and Bartling) and Intelligence (CRT, Wonderlic, and numeracy)
all varied across behavioral groups. However, like the correlation
analysis, the results often contradicted our theoretical
predictions. Regardless, it is important to note that these
behavioral groups revealed systematic differences in behavior
regardless of inconsistencies with theoretical predictions. That
is, due to the tension between some of our theoretical analyses
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of the influence of personal characteristics on behavior in our
moral dilemma and the observed behavior, either our theory or
our measures are still far from perfect.
Our results suggest that the effects of psychological, cognitive,
and demographic differences on behavior in experiments are
more complex than those implied by ceteris paribus hypothesis.
Subjects are endowed with mixtures of individual characteristics
that could present contradictory theoretical interpretations.
Despite this difficulty, characteristics of subjects that chose and
act similarly (i.e., belong to the same behavioral group) are more
likely to be similar between each other and different from those
that chose and act differently in individual characteristics. This
finding could not be detected using a simple correlation analysis.
We believe that the results of our analysis shed light on the
strength of the links between individual characteristics, behavior
in simple strategic games, behavior in real-effort moral dilemmas.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 | CPCIS Taxonomy.
Measure Method–Test (Reference) Related elicited characteristic
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES
Preferences over:
Risk aversion Multiple listing method (Andersen et al., 2006) Risk over lotteries
Loss aversion Multiple listing method (Andersen et al., 2006) Lotteries with losses
Time Multiple listing method (Andersen et al., 2006) Temporarily based payments
STRATEGIC PREFERENCES
Trust Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995)
Trust sent Trustor can sent only 0 or 10 Trust
Trust SM return Trustee respond to each possibility (Strategy Method SM) Reciprocity
Ultimatum Ultimatum (Güth et al., 1982)
Offer Strategy method, first player can send any even number between (0–20, 11
choices)
Altruism
First accepted offer When playing as a second player, player can reject any proposal Fairness
Number of advantageous offers rejected Fairness
Dictator game Dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986)
Strategy method, player can send any even number between (0–20, 11
choices)
Egalitarianism, Altruism, and
Selfishness
Bartling, Fehr, Marechal, and Schunk (BFMS) Task from Bartling et al. (2009)
Egalitarianism Zero to six choices of an equitative alternative over non-equitative Preferences for equitatives distribution
Altruism Zero to three choices of a detrimental alternative over equitative alternative Preferences for distribution that benefit
others
Selfishness Zero to three choices of a beneficial alternative over equitative alternative Preferences for distribution that benefit
herself
INTELLIGENCE
Pyschology
Raven Reduced version of the Raven Test in this case subjects have to choose
only 18 questions
Fluid intelligence
Cognitive reflection test (CRT) Extended version of the CRT described by Toplak et al. (2011) Reflection and impulsiveness
Wonderlic Reduced version of the Wonderlic Personnel Test, 24 questions with a
maximum of 6 min
Numeracy
Adding task correct (incentivized) Individual has to add 10 sequences of summations and its pay for each
correct addition
Numeracy capabilities with extrinsic
motivation
Adding task (no incentivized) Similar to the incentivized task but individuals are not paid by correctness
Academic
SAT Self-reported
ACT Self-reported
GPA Self-reported
Other
The reading the mind in the eyes test A sample test in which individuals were requested to guess the most likely
emotion of 36 pictures of eyes
Theory of mind
PERSONALITY—BIG FIVE
Openness Big five questionnaire with 44 items, John et al., 2008 Include traits of appreciation for unusual
ideas, curiosity, and variety of experience
Conscientiousness Big five questionnaire with 44 items, John et al., 2008 Tendency to be organized, disciplined,
dependable, and to prefer planned
behavior
Extraversion Big five questionnaire with 44 items, John et al., 2008 Tendency to seek stimulation by the
company of others, to be talkative,
energetic, and assertive
(Continued)
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TABLE A1 | Continued
Measure Method–Test (Reference) Related elicited characteristic
Agreeableness Big five questionnaire with 44 items, John et al., 2008 Tendency to be sympathetic,
compassionate and cooperative, kind, and
affectionated
Neuroticism Big five questionnaire with 44 items, John et al., 2008 Tendency to be moody, and to experience
easily emotions such as anger, anxiety,
and depression
DEMOGRAPHICS
Age Self-reported Numeric
Gender Self-reported Male or female
Volunteer hours Self-reported Range of number of hours allocated to
voluntary work or N/A
Work hours Self-reported Range of hours allocated to remunerated
work
Number of sibling Self-reported Range of number of hours allocated to
remunerated work or NA
Older sibling Self-reported Number of siblings older than the subject
Religiosity Self-reported Range of the frequency of service
attendance
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